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ABSTRACT This article investigates multiculturalism by examining the relation-
ship between migrants’ group demands and liberal states’ policies for politically
accommodating cultural and religious difference. It focuses especially on Islam. The
empirical research compares migrants’ claims-making for group demands in
countries with different traditions for granting recognition to migrants’ cultural
difference – Britain, France and the Netherlands. Overall, we find very modest levels
of group demands indicating that the challenge of group demands to liberal democ-
racies is quantitatively less than the impression given by much multicultural litera-
ture. Group demands turn out to be significant only for Muslims, which holds across
different countries. Qualitative analysis reveals problematic relationships between
Islam and the state, in the overtly multicultural Dutch approach, within British race
relations, and French civic universalism. This implies that there is no easy blueprint
for politically accommodating Islam, whose public and religious nature makes it
especially resilient to political adaptation.
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INTRODUCTION
A few years ago, some authors thought that western liberal democracies
would push decisively for policies that deliberately and explicitly recog-
nized and protected migrants as distinct ethnic groups (e.g. Kymlicka, 1995).
After 9/11, a fractious Gulf War, and the 2004 Madrid outrage, the mantra
‘we are all multiculturalists now’ (Glazer, 1997) has less salience, both as
normative rhetoric and as a policy option. Such shifts away from multi-
culturalism were arguably already occurring. The most overt European
experiment in multiculturalism, in the Netherlands, had already switched
from special policies for migrant groups to policies for individual migrants
within society (Entzinger, 2003). Similar changes were discernible in
Sweden (Soininen, 1999), and more recently, republican-style citizenship
rituals were introduced in Britain (Statham, 2003). Even brief French flir-
tations with differentialism, admittedly symbolic, suffered an early death
(Brubaker, 2003). Instead of celebrating diversity, assimilative cultural
demands – language skills, knowledge of national culture, citizenship rituals
– are the requirements for migrants in recent policy thinking.
In the sizeable theoretical literature on the subject, there has been a
strong preoccupation with the position of ethnic minorities and the – bene-
ficial or harmful – effects of ‘multiculturalism’, the extension of cultural
group recognition and rights to minorities (e.g. Habermas, 1994; Taylor,
1994). At stake in such discussions is the nation state’s capacity for main-
taining social cohesion as well as the liberal conception of individual rights
on which it rests. Problems are seen to arise from the increasing demands
that are put forward by migrant minorities for special group rights, recog-
nition, exemption from duties, and support from the state for their cultural
identities. These group demands challenge the concept of a unified, un-
differentiated citizenship, a development that is viewed by supporters of
multiculturalism (e.g. Parekh, 1996; Young, 1998) as a healthy antidote
against the prevalent ‘white’ cultural hegemony, and by opponents (e.g.
Schlesinger, 1998; Huntington, 2002) as a serious assault on the shared
communal values and solidarity necessary for cohesion and integration.
Proponents and opponents agree that such trends are widespread and deep
at the heart of contemporary societies, presenting, in Kymlicka’s (1995: 1)
words, ‘the greatest challenge’ to the liberal nation state.
Following the high-profile Rushdie and Headscarf controversies in
Britain and France respectively, and given the centrality of Islam to
Europe’s multicultural debates, it is surprising that discussions about
religion have often tended to be subsumed under those about other
expressions of cultural diversity. We consider that religion is an important
form of cultural expression and ought to be given specific consideration. So
does Charles Taylor, who refers to Islam specifically to exclude it from his
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politics of recognition because (1994: 62) ‘[f]or mainstream Islam, there is
no question of separating politics and religion . . . as many Muslims are well
aware, western liberalism is not so much an expression of the secular,
postreligious outlook that happens to be popular among liberal intellectuals
as a more organic outgrowth of Christianity’. Against this, Tariq Modood,
argues that Muslims’ claims are no more threatening or different in the way
they address liberal states than other claims for cultural diversity (2000:
188):
The political demands of Muslims . . . are not akin to conscientious objections,
to principled exemptions from civic obligations, but – akin to other movements
for political multiculturalism – are for some degree of Islamicization of the
civic; not for getting the state out of the sphere of cultural identities, but in some
small way for an inclusion of Muslims into the sphere of state-supported
culture.
However, Tariq Ramadan, another arguing for the place of Islam within
European states, claims that it is essential to understand the distinctiveness
of Islam as a religious belief system (2002: 207–8):
The central point is that Islam is, first and foremost, a divinely revealed religion,
with belief in its universal validity, a way of life, a concept of life and death, and
not merely the cultural characteristic of a specific population coming from
countries outside Europe. Indeed without taking into account this religious
dimension, all discussions about aspects of Islam in Europe – social and political
integration, economic progress, or other matters – would be, if not futile, highly
inadequate.
This stance seems to consider that the religious basis of Islamic belief makes
it a prior form of cultural allegiance, which if true, would go against
Modood’s suggestion of an easy possible cohabitation between Islam and
civic culture. Indeed, opponents of multiculturalism see Islam as a threat
for the same reason, thus Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ predicts
European societies divided along religious lines, for which immigration and
the unwillingness of Muslims to adapt is blamed. As he argues (2002: 204),
‘the degree to which Muslim immigrants and their children want to be
assimilated is unclear. Hence, sustained immigration is likely to produce
countries divided into Christian and Muslim communities’.
Such debates demonstrate that religion is important for understanding
multiculturalism and its consequences. We consider that religion matters
for at least two reasons. First, although European societies see themselves
as broadly secular, Christian religions often play important institutional
social and political roles, regardless of how many or how few people
actually believe or practice the religion. These institutional arrangements
define pre-existing conditions and the political environment into which
migrant religions have to find a space for their community. Second,
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religious identification is a belief system that can shape people’s core
identity and shape their associational activity and political behaviour. This
is likely to be enhanced for migrants, because they often live detached from
the grasp of core public institutions promoting civic values and rely on their
own religious institutions and family networks as a ‘community’ support
system. The nature of religion, and the demands it makes on its followers’
way of life, is likely to influence the extent to which migrants’ beliefs and
understandings adapt or resist when confronted with those of the dominant
culture.
In this article, we focus on the claims-making by minorities of migrant
origin for particularist group demands in Britain, the Netherlands and
France. In contrast to the many normative contributions (e.g. Bauböck,
1994; Kymlicka and Norman, 2000), we address the purported challenge of
claims for cultural difference empirically. Britain, the Netherlands and
France are suited for comparison with roughly similar proportions –
between 7.5 percent and 10 percent – of migrants and their descendants in
their populations, from similar waves of migration. Although their migrant
stocks come partly from similar and from different regions of origin –
Britain: the Caribbean and Indian Subcontinent; Netherlands: Indonesia,
the Caribbean, Morocco and Turkey; France: the Maghreb – they have
significant Muslim communities, making up about 3.5–6 percent. Our
original data-set on claims-making is drawn from 1992–98. This allows us
to compare the impact of Dutch multiculturalism, before it became less
facilitating of group demands, with Britain’s ‘race-centred’ cultural pluralism,
and French policies which strongly resist differentialism. Thus we examine
the challenge of group rights in relation to the different national policies
for cultural pluralism.
First, we discuss the challenge of group demands, before giving cross-
national details on policy approaches. After outlining our method, we make
an overview of claims-making for group demands across the countries,
before undertaking a qualitative analysis of those by Muslims.
THE CHALLENGE OF GROUP DEMANDS AND ISLAM
Others use the terms ‘multiculturalism’ or ‘differentiated citizenship’ for
migrants’ particularist group demands. Because we use the term ‘multi-
culturalism’ for a policy approach, we refer to ‘group demands’. ‘Group
demands’ is an umbrella term for the political field of claims by migrants
for group-specific rights, recognition, and exemptions from duties, with
respect to the cultural requirements of citizenship in their societies of settle-
ment. Although this is a heterogeneous category, all group demands share
two features: first, they are demands that go beyond the set of common civil
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and political rights of individual citizenship which are protected in all liberal
democracies; second, they are demands that, if realized, constitute the
recognition and accommodation by the state of the distinctive identities and
needs of migrant groups.1
Regarding the challenge of group demands, a first point is that the idea
of a unitary citizenship based on equal individual rights on which liberalism
rests is an ideology, and not an accurate depiction of reality for a typical
liberal nation state. Most nation states attribute some group rights in the
form of corporatist or federal arrangements, and most give preferential
treatment to specific religions over others. Thus, in Britain, the historical
accommodation of church and state has made the Monarch Head of State
and Head of the Church of England. To this day in Britain, the state
privileges its own religion within politics, for example, with Church of
England Bishops sitting in the second chamber, the House of Lords, which
is not the case for other denominations.
While some migrants’ group demands are for ‘parity’ of treatment with
other religious and ethnic groups, others go further, requesting special or
‘exceptional’ treatment relative to other groups in society. Some exceptional
demands are easily accommodated by liberal states. Indeed, as reparation
for past Nazi crimes, the German state itself promotes preferential treat-
ment for the associational activities of Jews and Roma. Nonetheless, some
migrants’ exceptional demands are less easy to accommodate, because they
actually challenge the very essence of liberal values. For example, Muslims
practising polygamy, female circumcision, or sharia divorce, would be
committing acts that contradict most liberal states’ legal and moral under-
standings of equality, between individuals, and men and women. How
common or representative such cases are is not clear. We suspect that many
immigrants to Europe are likely to adhere to different understandings of
Islamic practice, or that such practices would diminish over time, making
them atypical.
Although controversies over group demands are often played out
publicly through symbols, such as headscarves and minarets, they are also
conflicts about the distribution of material resources. Cultural demands
made by migrants in public education or welfare, where the state has
responsibilities for providing and distributing services, present challenges to
a pre-existing institutionalized context in which the native ‘white’ popu-
lation has defined stakes and real interests too. This is why cultural conflicts
often take place in institutional settings. The example of separate schooling
for Muslim girls in Britain is a parity group demand because other faith
groups have state-sponsored single-gender schools. One difference between
Catholic girls’ schools and Islamic ones, however, is that Islamic schools
make a religious faith central to education that promotes values that are
less commensurable with liberalism than modern Catholicism. Sometimes
Muslim parents’ arguments for faith schools make little effort to fit within
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the cultural pluralism of the civic community, for example, when they
express fear at the possible ‘westernization’ of their children. Important
here is that some Muslims see Islam as being more ‘true’ than other faiths,
and more authoritative than the state, which is problematic for liberal
democracies.
It is also necessary to recognize that the global Islamic upsurge is not
only a political movement, but also a revival of commitments that have
explicitly religious underpinnings (Berger, 1999). It has led to a restoration
of Islamic beliefs and lifestyles based on ideas about the relation of religion
and the state, women, and the moral codes of everyday behaviour, which
contradict the modern ideas of European liberal states. Islam is not just a
‘homeland hangover’ brought by new immigrants and followed by older
people, but it is often a source of identification for second and third
generations, attempting to find their place between the culture of their
parents and the rejection by their country of birth. Many of those choosing
to wear the dress and accoutrements of Islam are educated professionals,
the sons and daughters of assimilated migrants. The revival of Islam in
Europe is perhaps more of a reaction to attempted integration processes
than a – following the clichéd stereotype – product of an alien culture
imported by immigration.
A last point concerns the native publics of the host society. Native publics
and their liberal intellectuals often see themselves as the defenders and
upholders of the ‘myth’ of a unitary national citizenship. However sincere
such allegiances to liberal principles may be, their proponents may be
wedded to a version of those concepts that, when compared to reality, is an
historical anachronism or, alternatively, is based on nostalgia for the
nation’s past. This can lead to public discourse dynamics taking over and
the actual problems become distorted under a barrage of emotive rhetoric
about national values and identity.
We now outline the policy traditions for accommodating cultural and
religious difference in France, Britain and the Netherlands.
NATIONAL VARIANTS OF CULTURAL PLURALISM2
We look at integration policies and the political accommodation of religion
as the two aspects of political context which define a national variant of
cultural pluralism. Religion is an important aspect of a state’s political
accommodation of migrants’ cultural difference, which is often overlooked
or simply subsumed under a discussion of integration policies, though it is
actually distinct as a policy field, which has significant consequences. Thus,
many liberal states attempt consciously to shape the civic-cultural identifi-
cation of migrants toward their society of settlement, but do not attempt to
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shape migrants’ religious identifications in a direct way, not least because
the state upholds freedom of religious practice.
France’s naturalization laws were designed to ‘make Frenchmen out of
foreigners’ (Ireland, 1994). However, the state’s strong affirmation of indi-
vidual assimilation and the pursuit of a secular universalist republicanism
under the principles of liberté, égalité, fraternité, has provided very few
resources and little recognition to migrants for their associational activities.
‘Ethnic’ associations were permitted only in 1981. Migrants were expected
to integrate themselves by joining their compatriots in political parties and
trade unions, instead of mobilizing their own group interests and identities.
This led to difficulties, not least because the denial of cultural differences as
legitimate policy categories did not prevent cultural difference becoming a
basis for discrimination and racism, a fact demonstrated by the Front
National’s polemics against ‘un-assimilable immigrants’. Overall, France
has produced relatively few policy instruments for combating forms of
social exclusion rooted in cultural and ethnic difference. In addition, the
French state is assertively secularist. The 1905 law separating church and
state prevents direct public funding of religious communities. The state sees
public displays of religious faith as a challenge to laïcité, its own secular
republican ideology for a universal undifferentiated citizenship. Conse-
quently, the visible presence of Islam with mosques, minarets and calls to
prayer, has readily led to public ‘clashes of civilizations’ French-style. Over
time, minimalist commitments to basic requirements for Muslims to
practice their religion, including prayer spaces and food requirements, have
been granted. However, the centralized organization of Catholic, Protestant
and Jewish religions initiated by the Napoleonic state was only replicated
for Islam in December 2002. Discussions started in 1990 to establish a High
Authority of Islam, often foundering on the insistence by politicians that
such an institution remains a strictly religious council and does not become
a forum for political consultation (Laurence, 2003). The French Council
for the Muslim Religion is the first formalization of relations between
Muslims and the state. It is part-elected and part-appointed and arranges
chaplaincies in the army and prisons, acquires burial sites, grants ‘halal’
certificates, organizes pilgrimages, and builds mosques and prayer halls. This
development has not, however, prevented the banning of ostentatious
Islamic accoutrements in public life. In 2004, the Justice Minister Perben
expelled a woman from jury duty because he considered her headscarf a
sign of religious commitment that would prevent her impartiality. Also the
French Parliament, with the blessing of President Chirac, passed a bill by
494 to 36 votes banning the Muslim headscarf and all other overt religious
symbols from schools.
In Britain, migrants’ organization and political participation is facilitated
by the state for ethnic or racial minorities. A state-sponsored ‘race
relations’ industry emerged, backed by anti-discrimination legislation, the
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Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) and local bodies which report on
practices for ensuring equal treatment. Political elites adopted ‘race’ as a
category to address the disadvantage of minority populations caused by
discrimination. One outcome is that policies were tailored more to the
integration of Afro-Caribbeans under the umbrella term ‘black’ than
relatively later inflows of migrants from the Indian subcontinent (Hiro,
1991). Race relations politics was extended to Indians, Pakistanis and
Bangladeshis under the generic term ‘Asian’, which means that groups with
self-identifications that are non-racial, principally Muslims, were served less
well by the institutional apparatus (Modood, 1988; Statham, 1999). In
contrast to this ‘racialized’ sponsorship of minorities, religious institutions
receive no direct state support. Religion is relegated to a matter of private
individual conscience within public institutions, but the state does privilege
its own Church of England within politics. More than 20 Anglican bishops
sit in the House of Lords, and the Church of England, headed by the Queen,
stands as the official religion. The limit British law sets on extending rights
to minority religions was clearly demonstrated by the Rushdie ruling that
blasphemy does not extend to Islam. This was not because the religious
content of law was considered archaic or redundant, it had been used as
recently as 1977 to prosecute a poem depicting Christ as a homosexual. A
key feature of race relations legislation is that it attributes rights to secular
and not religious groups. Special laws with regard to racial discrimination
are not replicated with regard to religious discrimination (with the excep-
tion of Northern Ireland). Several interpretations of the Race Relations Act
1976 have not extended group rights against discrimination to Muslims,
although two ethno-religious groups, Sikhs and Jews, have been legally
considered ‘ethnic’ groups since 1983. Even when the CRE brought a case
against an engineering firm refusing to employ Muslims because it saw them
as ‘extremists’, the employer was found guilty only of ‘indirect discrimi-
nation’ against the racial category ‘Asians’, not for anti-Muslim sentiments
(Lewis, 2002: 250).
The Netherlands recognized early on that many ‘guestworker’ migrants
would remain and reacted through the inclusive Minderhedennota (1983)
with a goal of: ‘Achieving a society in which all members of minority groups
in the Netherlands, individually and also as groups, are in a situation of
equality and have full opportunities for their development’, in short, a
policy for ‘integration with retention of own culture’ (Entzinger, 2003: 63).
Importantly, Dutch policies saw migrants according to their group member-
ship and not primarily as individuals. Following the ‘pillarization’ (verzuil-
ing) tradition for institutionalized pluralism, this provided a large degree of
autonomy for ‘ethnic minorities’ in the cultural sphere, and incorporated
migrant elites into politics by subsidizing representative organizations and
including them in the policy process. Even civil service positions and local
voting rights were opened up to foreign residents. Elites considered that
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integration would be best accomplished through confident subcultures,
making a preservation of minority cultures essential to their incorporation.
In the 1990s, the realism that maintaining group diversity could also mean
structuring the disadvantages of groups, meant that policies shifted from
overt multiculturalism toward an emphasis on socioeconomic parity.
Nonetheless, the Dutch approach is still distinctive and offers a wider and
deeper range of cultural opportunities for minority groups. Dutch consoci-
ational politics has traditionally delegated state prerogatives to ‘pillars’ of
religious communities. Consequently, religious group rights extend further
than elsewhere, so that, for example, religious groups have a legal right to
public funding for their schools. The Netherlands has gone a long way
towards including religious minorities within its definition of the national
political community. The opening of Parliament is officially blessed by
leaders of all minority religions. There is a state-funded Islamic broadcast-
ing network, an Islamic school board, an Islamic pedagogic centre, and more
than 40 Islamic schools, all public funded with a regular Dutch curriculum.
Because Christian and Protestant ‘pillars’ had state-sponsored semi-
autonomous education, health and welfare institutions, it was difficult to
deny such rights to newer cultural and religious minorities.
Among our countries, there is sufficient variation to test whether the
different ways that states attribute cultural pluralism has an impact in
shaping claims-making for group demands. Here the continuum runs from
the Netherlands, which offers the most open version of cultural pluralism
by granting group rights and exemptions to minority and religious groups,
through to France, whose civic universalism embodied in the principle of
laïcité opposes all differentialism. Britain with its peculiar race relations
formula comes in between, recognizing some migrants’ group rights
through an ascriptive ‘racial’ identity, but not extending such privileges to
minority religions, and especially Islam. Before examining our samples of
group demands, we first comment on methods.
METHOD
To address our questions regarding group demands, we use media-based
data on public claims-making. We are fully aware that newspaper coverage
is not an undistorted and complete mirror of reality. From the multitude of
claims made on a daily basis by a variety of groups in liberal democracies
only a few are actually reported in the media. However, it is precisely this
publicly visible aspect of claims-making that is our interest, because this has
the potential to impact on public perceptions or policy making. Claims-
making that does not mobilize any media attention may be considered to
have not occurred, because its existence is known only to the would-be
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claimant. Our explicit aim is to explain the pattern of those claims that are
actually able to penetrate the mass media and which have the opportunity
to become part of the processes of public debate and policy deliberation.
In contrast to many media content analyses, we are not primarily inter-
ested in the way that the media frame events. Our focus is on the news
coverage of mobilization, public statements and other forms of claims-
making by non-media actors. Taking a cue from ‘protest event analysis’
from social movements (Rucht et al., 1998), our units of analysis are not
articles, but individual instances of political claims-making.
We define an instance of claims-making as a unit of strategic action in
the public sphere that consists of the purposive and public articulation of
political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks,
which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants
and/or other collective actors. Political decisions and policy implementations
are included, as is violence between contending groups, even if no explicit
verbal claim is reported, e.g. attacks between extreme-right, immigrant, and
antiracist groups, or between different ethnic or religious groups. This
makes the focus of inquiry ‘contentious politics’, i.e. processes of interaction
between actors, and the coalitions, alliances and networks, and conflict lines
which connect and relate different types of collective actors in a multi-
organizational field (McAdam et al., 2001).
Data are retrieved from one national newspaper per country: The
Guardian for Britain; NRC Handelsblad for the Netherlands; and Le
Monde for France. These are independent newspapers of public record with
a nationwide scope of coverage and readership. All are broadsheets with a
reputation for consistent and detailed coverage of migration and ethnic
relations. The main news sections of every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday
issue were coded for all political claims-making relating to immigration,
migrant integration, and racism and xenophobia.
Another common objection to our data is that some forms of claims-
making are successful because they are not reported in the media. Some
collective actors, especially more powerful ones, do not need the mass
media or may prefer to operate away from the public eye because they can
exert pressure by direct access to, and influence on, decision makers.
Some groups may be successful in the lobbying circuit without having to
demonstrate broad public resonance and support; e.g. a multinational
corporation may be effective simply by threatening decision makers with
disinvestments or capital flight. However, for most groups, and particularly
those in immigration, successful lobbying must be backed by public
visibility, resonance, and legitimacy. Therefore, we are confident that a
survey of the non-public claims-making of lobby groups would not show
very different patterns from the ones we present, apart from the fact that
the distribution of actors in such lobbying data would be skewed towards
the more institutionalized and resourceful ones. It should be made clear,
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however, that with our data, we cannot in a strict sense generalize beyond
public forms of claims-making.
An important question remains regarding whether our primary sources
are representative of the wider media landscape. We have tried to minimize
the problem of description bias (McCarthy et al., 1996) by coding only the
factual coverage of statements and events that appear in the newspapers,
and excluding comments and evaluations by editors or reporters. Even
when disregarding the explicit opinions of journalists, it could be that the
picture obtained in a particular country depends strongly on the newspaper
chosen. To check for such biases, we have drawn additional samples from
other newspaper sources. The comparisons of these alternative sources
reveal important differences in the rate of coverage of relevant claims,
especially between national quality papers and the more limited coverage
in tabloid and regional papers. However, such differences in coverage rates
coincide with strikingly similar distributions of acts on important variables.
Such inter-newspaper comparisons suggest that by using quality national
newspapers we obtain a valid picture of claims-making patterns.
Important variables coded refer to the identity of the actors making the
claim, including full organizational names, action forms, and (where
present) the size, target, and intensity of protest. Regarding the content of
the claims, we coded for each act up to three aims or demands, up to two
frames, and the actors on whom demands are made (addressee) or who are
objects of criticism. Further methodological details can be found elsewhere
(Koopmans and Statham, 1999a; Koopmans et al., 2005). The resulting data-
set is suitable for macro-level comparative analyses of broad issue-fields,
but at the same time can zoom in on qualitative aspects of particular actors
and claims, as we now hope to demonstrate.
THE OVERALL PICTURE OF MIGRANTS’ GROUP DEMANDS
From our coding definition, claims become categorized as group demands,
only when migrants request group-specific provisions or exemptions
relating to their cultural or religious differences. Thus, not all demands by
Muslims are coded as group demands. It is the content of the claim not the
claimant’s identity which determines whether it is a group demand. For
example, within schooling, a Muslim demand ‘for Islamic faith religious
lessons’ is clearly for particular cultural provision and coded as a group
demand, whereas one for ‘better schooling provision’ demands only greater
participation rights within education, and is coded among the social equality
claims.
A first empirical question is the size of the challenge of migrants’ claim-
making for group demands to liberal nation states. Table 1 shows cases
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where the substantive focus of migrant claims-making is for group demands
relating to cultural or religious difference. It gives figures, first, for all collec-
tive actors (first row), and then for migrants (second row), as a proportion
of all claims-making on immigration and ethnic relations. The third row
shows migrants’ claims for group specific demands as a proportion of
migrants’ claims-making.
First we see that, even when we include the claims by non-migrant collec-
tive actors, quantitatively, the proportion of claims-making about group
specific demands remains very modest: Netherlands 5.5 percent, Britain 7.7
percent, and France 6.6 percent. Second, migrants’ group demands consti-
tute a very small proportion of all claims, accounting for 2.0 percent in the
Netherlands, 3.4 percent in Britain, and 2.1 percent in France. According to
such figures, the doomsday scenario of ‘tribal antagonisms’ (Schlesinger,
1998: 13) pulling societies apart at the cultural seams, or Huntington’s
(2002) ‘clash of civilizations’, appear to be strongly overstated, at least for
Europe, as does Kymlicka’s (1995: 1) vision of multicultural demands being
the ‘greatest challenge’ to the liberal state.
Another finding goes against the expectations of scholars who have
conceptualized the citizenship configurations of nation states as policy
approaches that are the explanatory variable for the different trajectories
of migrant incorporation experienced across different countries (e.g. Favell,
1998; Joppke, 1996; Ireland, 1994; Koopmans and Statham, 2000; Safran,
1997). Our own research speculated that: ‘Since France invites migrants into
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Table 1 Claims-making for group demands: The Netherlands, Britain and
France, 1992–98
Netherlands (%) Britain (%) France (%)
All claims-making 5.5 7.7 6.6
over group demands/
All claims-making
Migrants’ claims-making 2.0 3.4 2.1
for group demands/All
claims-making
N 2,286 1,313 2,388
Migrants’ claims for 20.8 17.1 18.4
group demands/All
migrants claims-making
N 216 258 267
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the political community on the basis of equality, but to the exclusion of
cultural difference, it could follow that migrant claims for multicultural
rights are not nearly as important in this country as in Britain’ (Koopmans
and Statham, 1999b: 692). Accordingly, we would expect to find much lower
levels of migrants’ group demands in France, than in the Netherlands and
Britain, which officially see themselves as ‘multicultural’ and ‘multiracial’.
Against this, our data show similar levels of group demands in France,
Britain, and the Netherlands, which points to a limitation of national insti-
tutionalist approaches in shaping migrant behaviour in their own images.
Turning to the identities used to make group demands, there are at least
four types of collective identities for migrants: (1) generic status categories
of integration policies, e.g. as ‘ethnic minorities’ in the Netherlands, or as
immigrants (immigrés) in France; (2) ‘racial’, e.g. as ‘black’; (3) religious, e.g.
as Hindu; or (4) ethnic, or of the nationality of their country of origin, e.g.
as Roma or Turks. A fifth identity is the hybrid of ethno-religious for groups
for whom religion and ethnicity are indistinguishable. In addition, each
identity may refer to the country of residence, e.g. British Muslim Action
Front, or be composite, referring to multiple identities, e.g. the Turks-
Islamitische Culturele Federatie is ‘Turkish’ and ‘Islamic’.3 Such identifi-
cations overlap and are to an important degree in competition with each
other. The same migrant group may mobilize as ‘Pakistanis’, ‘Asians’ (race
relations’ category for Indian Subcontinent migrants), ‘Muslims’, ‘British
Muslims’ or as ‘ethnic minorities’. The self-identification used for entering
the public domain is strategic.
Table 2 shows the collective identities of migrants making group
demands. These were coded from the ways in which migrant collective
actors appeared in our newspaper sources, in particular from the names of
organizations and groups. Names of organizations are important vehicles
for the self-presentation of groups toward their constituency and wider
society, and are good indicators for a group’s self-identification.
The most striking feature is that more than half of these migrant group
demands were made using religious forms of identification in France
(53.1%), six-tenths in the Netherlands (60.0%), and two thirds in Britain
(65.9%). In addition, we see that the vast majority of these group demands
were made by migrants identifying themselves as ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic’
(France 51.0%, Netherlands 46.7%, Britain 61.4%). This is surprisingly high
for Britain, which sponsors the ‘Asian’ identity for Indian Subcontinent
minorities, and France whose policies do not recognize specific groups.
Again the impact of national context appears limited.4
A comparison of Islam with other migrant religions is further revealing.
Although Britain and the Netherlands have significant migrant populations
of Hindu faith, facing exactly the same integration and church/state policies
as Muslims, there is little evidence for group demands by Hindus (Nether-
lands 6.7%; Britain 2.3%). Likewise, the ethno-religious group, Jews, focus
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their attention much less on the group demands field than Muslims. Jews
make 2.2 percent group demands in the Netherlands, 6.8 percent in Britain,
and 8.2 percent in France, while they accounted for 8.1 percent of claims-
making by Dutch migrants, 5.5 percent by British, and 19.6 percent by
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Table 2 Collective identities used by migrants in claims-making for group
demands: The Netherlands, Britain and France, 1992-98
Netherlands Britain France
Policy-status identities 15.6 4.6 32.7
Foreigners 8.9 – –
Minorities/allochthonen 4.4 4.6 –
Immigrants 2.2 – 10.2
Illegal immigrants/sans papiers – – 2.0
Harki – – 20.4
Racial identities 2.2 22.7 0.0
Black – 18.2 –
Asian – 2.3 –
Other 2.2 2.3 –
Religious identities 60.0 65.9 53.1
Muslim 46.7 61.4 51.0
Hindu 6.7 2.3 –
Rastafarian 2.2 2.3 –
Other 4.4 – 2.0
Ethno-religious identities 2.2 6.8 8.2
Jewish 2.2 6.8 8.2
Ethnic and national identities 31.1 0.0 6.1
Sinti and Roma 2.2 – –
Turkish 15.6 – –
Chinese 2.2 – –
Mollucan 2.2 – –
Morocco 6.7 – 2.0
Other African 2.2 – 4.1
Surinamese 2.2 – –
Hyphenated identification with 2.2 9.1 14.3
country of residence
Sum total 111.1 109.1 114.3
N = 45 44 49
*Note that subcategories do not add up to total of categories due to rounding errors.
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French migrants respectively. This stands in sharp contrast to Muslims, for
whom between four-tenths and two-thirds of all claims-making was for
group demands (Netherlands 50.0%, Britain 67.5%, and France 41.7%).
Claims-making for group demands thus appears largely to be a group
specific phenomenon of Muslims.
With respect to the differences between Jews and Muslims, one can point
to the much longer history of political accommodation of Jews within
European societies. In addition, the vast majority of Jews practise their
faith, if at all, to the same limited extent as the vast majority of nominal
Christians. Such factors may explain why Jews make few group demands
relative to Muslims. However, such differences do not hold for Hindus, who
came in the same waves of migration, from the same regions, and who have
received similar levels of political and religious accommodation as Muslims.
Although Hinduism in some of its manifestations can promote values that
are equally as incommensurable to liberal democratic values as Islam,
Hindu group demands are largely invisible in the public domain.
We consider that this relatively low level of Hindu group demands
compared to Muslims is a result of the different infrastructures of the two
religions in their societies of settlement. Islam is a more collective and
public religion centred on the mosque, whereas there are many different
types of Hinduism, traceable in part to regional or caste differences, and
the home is often the principal location for worship in a religion which
demands few public celebrations (Hiro, 1991; Poulter, 1998). As a non-
proselytizing decentralized religion that is practised privately, Hinduism
has fitted more easily as a minority religion into the political space
granted to it. Also Hindu temples have not taken on the same functions
for the migrant community, providing services and negotiating at the
interface with political authorities, compared to mosques for Muslims. As
a consequence, Muslim self-identification appears to be particularly
resilient, even leading to demands for group rights and recognition in its
own name.
Regardless of the differences in national contexts for attributing group
rights, principally only Muslims make group demands. This finding provides
strong suggestive evidence that the relationship between liberal states and
their Muslim migrants leads specifically to claims-making for group
demands. On the one hand, it could be something specific to the political
position of Muslims in their societies of settlement, which produces claims-
making for group demands independently of national context. Here, we
hypothesize that it is the public nature of the Islamic religion, and the
demands that it makes on the way that followers conduct their public lives,
which makes Islam an especially resilient type of identity, and which results
in claims-making for group demands. On the other hand, it could be some-
thing specific to the way that liberal democratic states attempt to accom-
modate their Muslims. Here, we hypothesize that there are specific deficits
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in liberal states’ cultural provision for migrant and religious group needs
which impact disproportionately on groups who are practising Muslims. In
order to investigate this, empirically and cross-nationally, we undertake a
detailed qualitative analysis of Muslims’ group demands.
THE CHALLENGE OF ISLAM: MUSLIMS’ GROUP DEMANDS
Figure 1 shows the analytic dimensions of group demands for our quali-
tative comparison.
First, we distinguish between two types of group demands for rights:
‘exceptional’ and ‘parity’. By ‘exceptional’, we refer to those group demands
for rights that are not already granted to other native cultural, minority or
religious groups. Claims for exceptional group rights demand something
substantively ‘new’, or a special exemption, which, if realized, sets the
specific group apart from all other groups. It is particularly challenging
because it demands rights and exemptions that go beyond those granted to
other migrant or religious minorities. A demand to wear the headscarf in a
French state institution where exhibiting ostentatious religious symbols is
prohibited is an example of an exceptional group demand. By contrast,
‘parity’ demands for group rights request the same privileges and exemp-
tions from duties already extended to other religions and migrants. Here
the group demand is for equality with other groups, often those already
granted special treatment.
Generally, parity demands are less challenging and easier to accommo-
date than exceptional ones, because they do not directly confront the logic
of the category system used by a country’s policies for cultural pluralism.
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Type of group demand 
Exceptional
Parity
Collective identity  
Motivational Impetus for group demand 
Proactive
Reactive  
Level and Form of Protest Action for
group demand  
Level: Low; Medium; High
Form: Demonstrative; Confrontational;
Violent  
Overall Orientation 
Acculturative
Dissociative  
Figure 1 Analytic dimensions of claims-making for group demands
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Thus British Muslims demanding recognition as a discriminated group
within race relations, on the same basis as Jews, Sikhs, and racially defined
groups, is an example of a parity demand. Not all group demands are for
rights, some are weaker and simply mobilize a group’s ‘collective identity’
as a visible presence in the public domain. An example of this would be a
Muslim federation stating ‘we want to transmit the Islamic religion, not
politics’. This is not a demand for group rights made on the host state and
society, but asserts a specific group identity relating to religion or culture
within it. Our analysis focuses primarily on exceptional and parity group
rights demands, because these are more explicitly formulated, and engage
more clearly with a state’s policies.
Second, we consider the nature of the relationship between the state and
native public versus the Muslim group, which produces a group demand.
We refer to this as the motivational impetus of a group demand. A ‘pro-
active’ group demand is mobilized autonomously by the Muslim group,
independently from actions by the state and host society actors, and is a
more assertive type of claims-making. Conversely, a ‘reactive’ group
demand is mobilized in response to an intervention by state or native public
actors, for example, when the state officially bans or refuses to recognize a
form of religious or cultural expression.
Third, we look at the action forms used to mobilize a group demand.
Here we use the standard social movements’ categorizations for action
repertoires, which range from conventional and demonstrative to
confrontational and violent protest.
Overall, the strategic orientation of a group demand may be considered
either acculturative or dissociative in its relationship to a state’s cultural
pluralism. Acculturative claims-making fits within a state’s policies for
categorizing minority or religious groups, whereas dissociative claims-
making challenges a state’s approach to minority and religious difference,
by making a demand which goes further than, or ignores, current formula-
tions. Generally, one would expect exceptional rights demands to be dis-
sociative because they are the most demanding on the dominant host
culture, and are more likely to lead to reactions by state institutions and
native public discourses. Parity rights demands may also become highly
controversial, and provoke strong native reactions, though they are more
likely to be acculturative because they try to fit into an existing framework
of political accommodation.
The Netherlands: Islam pushing for a new ‘pillar’
The Muslim group demands in our Dutch sample cover issues common to
discussions of multiculturalism. Six refer to issues about Islamic schools, six
are about attempts to set up a Dutch Imam school, and the remainder cover
requirements and exemptions for halal meat, provision of religious and
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cultural centres, Imams for Muslim prisoners, broadcasting rights for
Muslims, and divorce by sharia law.
Sixteen of the 21 cases in our sample are demands for ‘parity’ group
rights with other groups, four are claims for ‘exceptional’ group rights, and
only one stands outside the context of rights demands and mobilizes a
‘collective identity’.
Concerning the action forms used to mobilize demands, there is only a
single case of protest. Here the Aya Sofia Association and the Mosque
Neighbourhood Association Milli Görüs in Amsterdam organize a 6000
strong demonstration against the refusal of the borough to permit a large
cultural centre. Muslims use conventional action forms such as public
speeches in all other cases, which gives a first indication of the impact of the
receptiveness of Dutch multicultural politics.
At first glance, our findings fit the cosy image that Dutch group-based
multicultural policies produce a pacified and acculturative form of group
demands. The state grants minority group rights openly in a way that
encourages migrants to see themselves as new groups with new group
demands. Indeed, the Dutch political space is so receptive to group claims,
that even for Muslims, a group which other countries find difficult to accom-
modate, it is hard to make exceptional group demands. This is because the
state appears ever willing to acknowledge another cultural religious ‘pillar’
within its national political community, using the principle that what is
already granted to some groups must therefore be extended to all groups.
Another finding pointing to the confidence of Muslims in the
Netherlands, is that 17 of the 21 cases of Muslim group demands were
proactive, compared to only three that were reactive, and one that was
unclassifiable. Again this seems to point to the beneficial outcomes of Dutch
multiculturalism, which creates incentives for Muslims to make group
demands. Before getting too carried away with the benefits of Dutch multi-
culturalism, however, it is worth looking more closely at specific examples.
Turning to the exceptional group demands, a first example is where a
separate Islamic Butchers’ Association is set up with the claim that Muslims
are unable to follow the regular training and education of butchers because
their faith prohibits them dealing with pork. Another exceptional group
demand occurs when the Union of Moroccan Muslim Organizations
(Ummon) advocates educating Imams in the Netherlands, and providing
education in the language and knowledge of Dutch society for foreign
Imams. These are good examples of Muslims having the confidence to
proactively demand new exceptions as a group in the belief that this will be
straightforwardly accommodated by the state. Although they are excep-
tional group demands, the strong group-based enforcement within Dutch
multicultural policies means that, overall, these claims are acculturative
rather than dissociative, and unlikely to provoke reactions from the host
society.
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In contrast, it is the strength of the group rights tradition in Dutch politics
that causes another of our examples of exceptional group rights demands.
In this case, Muslims actually challenge the consequences for them of the
over-liberal tendencies within Dutch multiculturalism. The Dutch Muslim
Council and the Moroccan Women’s Society come out publicly against the
bill proposed by the Secretary of Justice to recognize and accommodate
one-sided marriage dissolution according to the laws of immigrants’
countries of residence. Here the dissociative basis of the Muslim demand is
against the proposed policies of the state, which appears willing to grant
cultural group rights to Muslims that at least some important groups do not
even want. In this example, the rosy image of the consequences of cultural
pluralism Dutch-style begins to slip. Indeed, the biggest threat or challenge
to the integrative capacity of the nation state in this instance is from the
over-willingness of Dutch policy makers to grant exceptional rights rather
than from the Muslims’ group demands themselves.
Looking now at examples of Muslim demands for parity rights, it is clear
that many would constitute demands for exceptional group rights in Britain
and France. Thus the Islamic Broadcasting Foundation claims that its right
to broadcast on the public channel is a good way of advancing the integra-
tion of Muslims into society. The Halal Food Foundation announces that it
hopes to end the ‘unreliable’ supply of ritually slaughtered meat for the
Islamic consumer after being granted the right to introduce their own
hallmark, a concession giving parity with Jews. The Islamic Council of the
Netherlands and researchers for the Islamic Chair of the University of
Amsterdam, make a demand that there should be between 25 and 30 Imams
employed in prisons. According to their research, this would bring Islam
proportionally in line with other faith denominations. These examples
demonstrate, first, the far-reaching sponsorship of group rights by the
authorities, and second, that this creates a political space and set of
incentives for group demands by Muslims. This legitimation of group
demands has the effect of making those Muslim group demands seem
officially easy to accommodate, which in Britain and France would most
likely provoke reactions from states and native publics.
Relating to the training of Imams, we find the following group demands:
The Centre for Islamic Studies advocates state sponsorship for the
education of Imams, on a par with that provided for Christian vicars and
priests, on the condition that the government does not interfere in the
substance of the education. In another, Ummon requests additional Dutch
language training and knowledge of society as part of the education for
Imams. The holder of an Islamic professorial chair at a university comes out
in favour of a Dutch Imam education, as does a resident Imam. Against this,
the President of the Turkish–Islamic Cultural Federation strongly criticizes
the proposals of Member of Parliament Dijkstal to found a Dutch Imam
school. Here we find a range of different positions being expressed by
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leading organizations from different factions within the Muslim community,
all in response to an agenda of group rights set by the state. These examples
are illustrative of another feature of the controversies about Islam in Dutch
society. Instead of controversies occurring between the native population
and Muslims, Dutch state policies tend to promote controversies and
competition over resources within different sections of the Muslim
communities.
Such factionalism and competition within Muslim communities may lead
to the proliferation of ever-smaller denominations of groups, who demand
their own group rights from the state. Further evidence comes from our
claims on Islamic schools. In one, the Foundation of Islamic Primary
Education (IQRA) demands that different denominations from within
Islam have the right to separate schools.5 In another, the Headmaster of the
Yunus Emre Islamic primary school in The Hague advocates that a new
school should be founded for a more orthodox Islamic education. On the
same matter, the Islamic School Board Association (ISBO), an umbrella
organization for 29 Islamic schools in the Netherlands, publicly rules that
the distinction between whether a school follows liberal or orthodox Islamic
teaching is unimportant. Once more, this issue demonstrates that Dutch
multiculturalism encourages Muslims to set up ever smaller denominational
groups, through establishing new organizations which they expect will
receive state recognition and subsidies. Also, the orthodox Islam that these
smaller factions will teach is likely to reproduce the separatist tendencies
that will lead to internally cohesive Muslim communities, but ones which
are inward-looking, and which hardly fit into Dutch society. Here we
witness once more that Dutch liberal multiculturalism risks letting
community group rights take precedence over the national community.
Such an approach may take Dutch society in a direction that may repro-
duce parallel and divided rather than cohesive societies.
BRITAIN: ISLAM AS A CHALLENGE TO RACE RELATIONS
In our group claims by Muslims in Britain, five relate to the issuing of a
fatwa against Salman Rushdie for his novel, Satanic Verses. Another five
relate to the perceived stigmatization and lack of public respect by the
native population for Islam. Of the remainder, a significant proportion are
about the relationship between the state and the Muslim community,
including claims about subsidies and recognition for Islamic schools,
religious education in state schools, and anti-discrimination measures,
prison treatment, the suitability of social amenities provision and political
representation with respect to Muslims.
Of the 27 group demands, nine are for exceptional rights, nine for parity
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rights, and nine do not make rights demands but mobilize a collective
identity. This differs from the Netherlands where most demands are for
parity, not exceptional rights. Generally, this indicates that British Muslims
have more difficulty fitting their demands within the framework for multi-
culturalism than their Dutch counterparts.
Regarding their motivational impetus, we find a strong tendency for
proactive group demands, with 20 proactive cases, five reactive, and two
unclassifiable, which is similar to the Netherlands. This shows that British
Muslims have sufficient incentives from their country’s policies to assert
themselves autonomously about issues relating to their cultural and
religious identification. Whereas Dutch Muslims’ assertiveness was almost
entirely acculturative (and for parity demands), a significant proportion of
British Muslims’ proactive demands are dissociative (and for exceptional
demands). Thus British Muslims’ claims-making for group demands is more
confrontational.
This confrontational nature of Muslim group demands is underlined by
their action repertoire. In seven of the 27 cases, Muslims use protest to
mobilize their group demands, and five of these are confrontational or
violent events. Thus Muslim youths petrol bomb a Bingo hall in protest
against a company called ‘Mecca’ using its brand name publicly to promote
gambling. In another, Muslim tenants launch a petition against Blackburn
Council requesting that their toilets be repositioned so that they no longer
face Mecca. In further cases, Muslim parents organize boycotts by their
children of state schools, against what they see as the harmful effects of
comparative religion lessons in the national curriculum.
Turning to the nine exceptional group demands, which are all proactive,
three refer to the Rushdie affair and challenge the authority of the state.
Thus the Muslim Parliament appeals to the authority of Islam above British
law: ‘He (Rushdie) has committed a capital offence. An Islamic legal
authority has passed a judgement. It’s just like a court passing a judgement
in this country. The Muslim community feels that this judgement is right and
legal.’ In others, by the Muslim Parliament and the Bradford Council of
Mosques, anti-Rushdie sentiments are tempered by emphasizing that anti-
Rushdie campaigns should remain lawful. Another exceptional demand is
where a Muslim prisoner challenges the prison’s ‘strip search’ method. He
claims an entitlement to maintain his religious beliefs and that a decision
not to provide him with modest clothing was ‘unlawful and unreasonable’.
A boycott against comparative religion classes, is supported by the
Association of Muslim Schools, who argue: ‘If they get bombarded with
different ideologies and different thinking, the Muslim child gets so clicked
on to what the teacher is saying, that he or she thinks whatever the teacher
is saying is the truth.’ Welfare provision by state authorities is a further
target of exceptional demands. For example, the Muslim Parliament argues
that the CRE is inadequate for addressing discrimination against Muslims
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and advocates setting up a ‘Muslim welfare state’. Another exceptional
demand addresses a non-state actor. Muslims in Nottingham criticize a
shop-owner for displaying shoes that have verses from the Koran printed
on them: ‘It is more serious than Salman Rushdie. Rushdie wrote a book
which you carry in your hand. Here the holy name goes on the feet!’
These examples show that Muslims’ exceptional group demands do not
fit easily in race relations politics in Britain, and are not easily accommo-
dated. Many demands that we cite are highly incommensurable with the
values of the state’s minority politics. According to our interpretation,
British Muslim assertiveness is not simply an inherent characteristic of
Islam as a belief system, but an outcome that is importantly shaped by the
political accommodation with which minorities are confronted. British
Muslims achieve group rights as racial, ethnic or national minorities, but
not as religious minority groups. Hence Muslims are included as a special
group in the political community only indirectly, as ethnic or racial
minority groups, and not directly as Muslims, which is how they see them-
selves. Living in a country with which they identify as much as other ethnic
minorities,6 Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims feel aggrieved that their
preferred form of self-identification is not legally sanctioned. Muslims
perceive that this leaves them as ‘second class’ minorities. They see them-
selves as less protected from discrimination than other minority groups,
and as believers of a faith that the state has been unwilling to uphold on
a par with other minority religions, such as Judaism and Sikhism. British
Muslims respond assertively by making demands on a state which they
perceive relegates them to a ‘second class’ status in the national
community.
This interpretation receives further support from the parity group
demands, which are more acculturative, and construct a vision of how
Muslims would like to position themselves within British race relations.
One example occurs within the Runnymede Trust’s consultations on
‘Islamophobia’ and calls for radical changes in the attitudes of politicians,
media and community leaders to fight discrimination against ‘British
Muslims’. Thus the Muslim College criticizes the state for not granting anti-
discrimination measures to Muslims to the extent it does for others, arguing
that, ‘the vast majority of our community want to live in this country and
want to be citizens of this country. It is our right as citizens to be able to say
to the country, “Here, we think your policies are wrong.”’ In another, after
the 1995 Bradford riots, Muslim community leaders and the Muslim
Parliament claim that ‘Pakistanis are twice as likely to be unemployed than
Afro-Caribbean or Indian people, there is no other reason for this than
discrimination or demonization of Muslims’. In similar vein, two editors of
Muslim newspapers question the suitability of the CRE for ‘Muslim racial
problems’, with the claim that ‘the Muslim population is doubly discrimi-
nated against, first because of their skin colour, and second because of their
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religion’. Such claims are not confrontational expressions of cultural
difference per se, but constitute reasoned arguments for more space to be
granted so that Muslims can participate fully and equally as citizens in the
national community. Such examples are not atypical.
Muslims’ perceived grievances are not just about higher levels of
discrimination than other minority groups, but about how to fit their
religious faith community into the landscape of British civic values. This
defines the cleavage between race relations and Muslims. On one side,
Muslims assert their civic credentials as ‘British Muslims’, aggrieved at what
they perceive as the discrimination against them by the state and native
society. And on the other, the state pretends that Muslims are part of the
British community, but steadfastly refuses to grant them the group rights
that they fear would foster a segregated community of religious zealots
living outside of British law.
FRANCE: ISLAM IN RESPONSE TO L AÏCITÉ
This sample of Muslim group claims is strongly shaped by a defining
moment in the relationship between the French state and Islam, the ‘head-
scarf’ controversy (affaire du foulard). Fourteen of 25 demands directly
refer to wearing headscarves in public institutions, and four-fifths are in
1993 or 1994. Issues include calls for dialogue and respect for all faiths and
traditions, criticisms of the circulaire Bayrou, when the Minister ruled that
headmasters could exclude pupils wearing headscarves as ostentatious
religious symbols from state schools, protests against the exclusion of pupils,
and calls for private Islamic schools following such expulsions. Regarding
other issues, five refer to Islam compared to other religions in political life,
a few concern Islamic universities for training Imams, religious education
in schools and mosque building.
Most French Muslims’ group demands are for exceptional rights (16 of
25), five are for parity rights, and in four the group simply express their
collective identity. Compared to the Netherlands (less than one-fifth) and
Britain (one-third), this is a higher proportion of exceptional rights
demands. French republican secularism laïcité strongly resists all group
demands, and especially those which are religious, with the outcome that
Muslims’ group demands are predominantly dissociative. Like the British,
French Muslims tend to make group demands that confront the state
authorities’ policies for cultural pluralism, but unlike the British, a signifi-
cant proportion of French Muslims’ group demands are made in response
to direct interventions by the state, producing equivalent numbers of
reactive and proactive demands (13 reactive, 12 proactive). This indicates a
more defensive stance by French Muslims and gives a first indication that
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it is the French state’s assertiveness in applying universalist principles which
is important in shaping claims-making for group demands.
Given this apparently hostile institutional setting, we find surprisingly
few protests in France, and the three protests have demonstrative not
violent forms. Each protest occurs in response to an expulsion from a state
school. In Grenoble, 1000 Muslims demonstrate outside an appeal
committee for a student excluded from gym. A placard makes clear the
protest is against ‘an anti-religious laïcism that is a threat to social peace’,
whereas others assert the importance of the headscarf as a French identity
for Muslims, ‘France is my freedom, my foulard too’ and ‘Muslim yes,
French too’. The other cases are by 100 people in Goissainville and 300 at
Garges-lès-Gonesse.
Looking at the exceptional cases, we see more evidence for the defen-
sive nature of group demands in response to an assertive state. Twelve of
16 are reactive, and 14 of these refer to headscarves. Our headscarf cases
provide important insights on the nature of the conflicts between Muslims’
group demands for the public expression of Islamic identity and French
institutionalized laïcité.
Thus the General Secretary of the Union des organisations islamiques de
France (UOIF) declares at a 3000–8000 strong gathering, that ‘laïcité must
not be allowed to become a new religion, but a neutral space where liberty
is given to everyone. A 12-year-old child is presented by the media like an
enemy of laïcité just because she wants to do her thing.’ In another, the
UOIF affirms its support for the principles of laïcité but adds that this
includes a respect for the right to difference (droit à la difference) when it
responds to Minister Bayrou’s declaration that wearing a headscarf is not
to be permitted at state schools if it is used as an ostentatious religious
symbol. When the Conseil d’Etat annuls the exclusion of three girls in
Seine-Saint-Denis, the Rector of the Muslim Institute and the Grande
Mosqée de Paris calls on Muslims to live in peace and mutual respect, and
in dialogue with their neighbours, but also expresses satisfaction with what
he interprets as this recognition by the state of Muslim specificity and
respect for some of its traditions in the law. There are several examples like
this, where the claim reaffirms laïcité, but in doing so requests more space
for the expression of cultural difference, often making clear, however, that
this would be an expression of ‘culture’ not ‘politics’. A minority are more
separatist in orientation. Another response to Bayrou and exclusions is by
the President of the regional Islamic council and Lille-Sud Mosque, who
declares himself scandalized by the level of rejection that appears on the
back of laïcité, continuing that the state has left Muslims no alternative
other than to turn to private schools.
One would expect it to be a contradiction in terms to find an exceptional
demand that is acculturative towards laïcité, but there is an example, which
is unusual and revealing about conflicts over Islam. The Union des jeunes
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musulmans (UJM) from Lyon criticizes the public authorities who stamped
the identity card of a woman, bearing a photo of her wearing a headscarf,
with the words ‘practising Muslim’ (musulman très practicant) in the
‘distinguishing marks’ category. The UJM expresses concern about the
segregationist attitude of the authorities with respect to the French Muslim
community (la communauté musulmane française), demanding equal treat-
ment for all citizens, and stating that the principle of freedom of cultural
expression ought to be enforced within a framework for well-founded
laïcité. Here the UJM uses the republican principle of laïcité to denounce
what it sees as the stigmatization of Muslims, who are officially singled out
as a group, by other sections of French society. The fear is that by being
given the dubious exceptional right of public demarcation on their identity
cards, this may be used discriminatively against them. Interestingly, the
authorities dismiss this event as a clerk’s one-off error and reassert the
indivisibility of French citizenship.
To explain why Islam faces such strong cultural opposition, it is import-
ant to see that the French state views Muslim associational activity as a
double challenge to its authority. First, Islam is a group identity that allows
the largest set of migrants to organize collectively, thus promoting the type
of sectional cultural interests that is anathema to self-understandings of
French citizenship. Second, Islam is the faith of a sizeable population who
actually practise their religion, and whose religious belief places restrictions
on an individual citizen’s duties in public life. Thus Islam allows the collec-
tive organization and promotion of religious-based values that challenge
the politicized secularism of the state.
In many cases, French Muslims make group demands that try to negoti-
ate a degree of recognition for Islamic symbols and values within a belong-
ing to the nation. This is also evident in their parity demands, which deny
religion, either by advocating secular-civic forms of Muslim associational
activity, or alternatively, by claiming that religious practice is outside the
political realm.Thus, the President of l’Union des familles musulmanes-Islam
de France (UFM) argues that family ways oppose Islamic extremism,and the
aim of his laïque association is to reconcile the rights and duties of Muslims
resident in France,theArab culture (la culte arabe),and the French civil code.
He distinguishes between a political Islam of extremism, which is rejected,
and the potential contribution of civic associations of recognized secular
Muslim minorities to French political life. Expressing similar sentiments, the
UOIF’s general secretary calls for an ‘islam de France’, arguing that it is a
non-negotiable prerequisite for engaging in political life, that all allegiance
to a foreign country must be renounced, and the democracy, laws and values
of the Republic respected. In another, the Paris Mosque’s Rector expresses
disappointment at not being invited by the President of the Republic to his
ceremony of good wishes (voeux) for the heads of religions, alongside the
Archbishop of Paris, the Head Rabbi of France, and the President of the
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Protestant Federation. Nonetheless,he also points out that the Paris Mosque
was founded by state decree, thereby advocating that the state ought to
establish a centralized Islamic religion, and the same relationship that it has
with the other faiths. The remaining Muslim parity demands also request the
same place for Islam as the restricted role already granted to other faiths,
namely to concentrate on worship not politics. Thus the aptly named Associ-
ation pour le dialogue islamo-chrétien et les rencontres interreligieuses (ADIC
– association for an Islamo-Christian dialogue and inter-religious meeting)
calls for ‘fraternité’ (brotherhood – echoing the state’s motto liberté, egalité,
fraternité) between the three monotheistic religions in France.
The strict separation between religion and politics in France makes any
publicly visible associational activity by Muslims appear problematic and a
challenge to the laïcité principle. Like Britain, France is unwilling to
accommodate political space for Muslims, but is more forthright and
explicit in enforcing this stance. French Muslims are under no illusions that
religious faith has no part in civic public life. Conflicts arise in Muslim inter-
actions with state authorities. Mostly Muslims are defending their group
against a state enforcement of laïcité, but at the same time they make efforts
to define Islam within national belonging. This is especially evident when
group demands are for an ‘Islam de France’, or a secular-associational
Islam, or an apolitical religious Islam. We find very little evidence for
separatist demands, or, in contrast to Britain, expressions proclaiming the
political-legal authority of Islam above the state. Nonetheless, the French
state’s entrenched opposition to all religion in public life, and its suspicion
that Islam entails political aspirations, leads to an ongoing problematic
relationship between France and her Muslims.
CONCLUSION
This article has addressed the leading question of the challenge of group
demands to liberal democratic states. To our knowledge, we are the first to
test assumptions underpinning the multiculturalism debates with evidence
drawn from a systematic representative sample of this scale and type. This
allowed us to conduct a qualitative analysis of group demands located
within an overall cross-national comparative picture.
First, we found relatively few group demands in all countries. This
suggests the strong emphasis on group demands in the literature is not
matched by migrants’ own perceptions of their political realities and
aspirations in their societies of settlement. Overall, we suspect many
scholars have mistakenly raised the high prominence of a few cases, such as
Rushdie, to general theories about the integrative capacity of the liberal
nation state, leading to exaggeration.
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Second, we found the same levels of group demands in countries regard-
less of national differences in their approaches to cultural pluralism.
Contrary to previous suppositions (Ireland, 1994; Koopmans and Statham,
1999b), this shows that, at least for group demands, there are limitations in
the degree to which nation states are able to shape migrants’ political
identifications in their own image. However, closer inspection revealed this
to be a group-specific deviation from the norm that held for migrants using
Muslim or Islamic identities. Our qualitative analysis sought to shed further
light on the relationship between Muslims’ group demands and national
forms of political accommodation (see Figure 2 for an overview).
Closer investigation of the Netherlands made us sceptical that granting
multicultural rights strengthens political integration in multiethnic societies.
For a start, we found the state sometimes promoting group rights for
Muslims, which more liberal Muslim groups did not want. The Secretary of
Justice’s Bill to allow one-sided marriage dissolution put group law above
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State and Native Society: Rights Granted 
Netherlands Britain France
Netherlands Britain France
Minority
group rights  
Yes No
Religious 
group rights 
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Muslim Claims-making for Group Demands 
Type of group
demands   
Parity 
Collective Identity 
Exceptional 
Motivational
Impetus of
group
demands   
Proactive Proactive Reactive/Proactive 
Relative Level
and Form of
Protest for
group
demands  
Low Protest 
Demonstrative 
High Protest 
Confrontational/
Violent
Medium Protest 
Demonstrative   
Overall
Orientation of
group
demands   
Acculturative Dissociative Dissociative 
Exceptional Parity
No No
Only racial and
ethnic groups 
Figure 2 Summary of findings on Muslims’ claims-making for group
demands: The Netherlands, Britain, France, 1992–98
national civic law by denying the individual equality of women. Here the
famous Dutch tolerance seemed prepared to sanction similar attitudes – i.e.
inequality of women – to the illiberal ones that it has long tolerated for
decades from Protestant fundamentalists. This is only one case, but is
instructive about the impact of policies on associational activity by Muslims.
The state grants so many group rights that being acculturative in the Dutch
political context does not substantively mean being integrated into the
national community, but in some cases being separated from it. Dutch
multiculturalism may lead to less public conflicts, but this can also be read
as a lack of care for ensuring community cohesion. If the native Dutch
communities are self-organized in their own ‘pillars’ and their lives do not
come into any institutional contact with Muslims, then why should they be
bothered by Muslims’ strange demands and odd-sounding customs?
Such a reading is supported by other more recent examples of contro-
versial issues about group rights arising from initiatives taken by main-
stream institutions and authorities, which were not in response to any
correspondent demands from the Muslim community. These include the
aborted attempt to introduce a police headscarf, and an initiative by several
housing corporations to construct ‘Muslim apartments’ with specifically
adapted floor-plans to accommodate the alleged Muslim need for separate
‘private’ (read female) and ‘public’ (read male) living spaces. Such contro-
versial initiatives did not result from pressure from Muslim organizations
(and were even opposed by some of them) but they did contribute to a
public image of Muslims as a group constantly requiring special provisions.
In view of the recent turn against multiculturalism in the Netherlands, one
may seriously question whether such well-intentioned (but patronizing)
initiatives have really improved intercultural relations in the Netherlands.
This pessimistic interpretation is further underlined by the fact that the
socioeconomic position of Dutch migrants, and of Muslims in particular, is
decidedly worse than in several other European immigration countries (see,
e.g. Thränhardt, 2000; Koopmans, 2003; Statham and Koopmans, 2005).
Surprisingly, such socioeconomic problems are hardly publicly addressed by
ethnic minority or Muslim organizations (see Koopmans et al., 2005). In this
light, Dutch multiculturalism may be viewed more sceptically as an oppor-
tunity structure that not only channels migrant claims toward cultural group
demands, but at the same time away from the pressing socioeconomic disad-
vantages that face many Muslims.
In contrast, we found British Muslims mobilizing assertively, sometimes
violently, and often in ways that directly target the workings and principles
of state authorities. The state remains unwilling to grant rights to Muslims,
fearing that their associational activities cannot easily be included within its
secular integration formula, not least because they aim to promote a
political role for the Islamic faith. Indeed, we find incommensurable
demands by Muslims that appear to make such fears well founded. To be
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fair, we also find a significant number of group demands that are made
within the race relations framework and that would be relatively easily
accommodated if Muslims were categorized as an ‘ethno-religion’ in law.
Nonetheless, we consider that it is unlikely the British multiracial politics
will be able to accommodate Islam without ongoing conflicts, mostly in
public debates, at times on the streets, and on occasion through acts of
violence.
French Muslims are more reactive in mobilizing their demands on the
state and their advocacy for religious recognition is more defensive.
Religious demands tend to be acculturative, such as those by the Rector of
the Paris Mosque, asking for little more than accommodation for Islam
within the state’s organization of religious communities. In several
examples, Muslims drew on Republican laïcité as the legitimating basis for
their demands. The headscarf cases also demonstrated that the institutional
conflicts about the place of Islam are often brought forward by the state
asserting its laïcité. Attempts to turn ‘Muslims into Frenchmen’ have shaped
a sort of French Islam, but so far this is not a pacified Islam able to dis-
appear under the mask of common citizenship. The risk is that too strong
assimilative pressures may in the future push migrant groups away from
their presently still strong identification with the French political culture,
and into a choice between a neutered or a politicized Islam.
We tested three national approaches and found each problematic in
different ways. This gloomy conclusion arises in part from the fact that Islam
cannot simply be confined to privatized religious faith, but advances into
the public realm of politics where the state’s authority and civic citizenship
obligations reign supreme. However, immigration bringing new religious
groups into a community is hardly without historical precedent. Large-scale
immigration of Irish Catholics and Jews from Eastern Europe to Britain,
were distinct religious and ethnic groups who over time were incorporated
into the national community. Accommodating Islam will be problematic,
though it is perhaps better to have political conflicts over being part of a
national community, than to have minorities who see themselves apart from
civil society. One possibility is the emergence in time of more ‘domesti-
cated’ national forms of Islam, whose demands are more easily included
within existing frameworks, and whose believers share more of the core
values and worldviews of the majority public. Alternatively, failure by
political institutions to recognize and include the specificities of Islam may
lead to grievances, turning future generations either towards political
ideologies which challenge the West, or a life of alienation and anomie.
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Notes
1 This definition is similar to Kymlicka and Norman’s ‘minority rights’ (2000, p. 2).
It differs because they require a state’s recognition of migrants’ identities and a
need to be ‘intentional’. Against this, group-specific state provisions are often an
extension (even reluctant) of existing arrangements, by default, to migrant
groups. Our definition is less normative not requiring the state’s (good)
‘intention’.
2 Substantive overviews are Hiro (1991) for Britain; Entzinger (2003) for the
Netherlands; and Ireland (1994) for France. Detailed information on Muslims
appears in Laurence (2003) for France, Rath et al. (1999) for the Netherlands,
and Statham (2003) for Britain.
3 Such cases were coded for both identities, thus the categories in Table 2 add up
to more than 100 percent.
4 After the dominance of Muslim identifications, we see at a secondary level
evidence for national differences, e.g. more racial identifications in Britain, more
ethnic and national identities in the Netherlands, and more status ones in France.
Another group-specific exception deserving comment is the Harki who make
one-fifth (20.4%) of group demands in France. The Harki are Muslims, though –
unlike other Muslim groups – this is not their primary identity for group
demands. Such exceptional group behaviour is explained by national context.
The French state extends special recognition to this group who are descendants
of soldiers who fought for la patrie in colonial wars against Algeria and
immigrated to the Motherland after defeat. Organizations like the aptly named
‘Justice pour les Harkis’ use what they perceive as a special recognized group
status as a legitimating resource to make demands that set them apart from other
migrant groups.
5 In the Dutch case, this is not an exceptional group rights demand because it is a
right that is already extended, for example, to the Reformed and Calvinist
denominations of Dutch Protestants.
6 Asked whether they thought of themselves as British, 66 percent Pakistani and
60 percent Bangladeshi minorities (predominantly Muslim) answered affirma-
tively, compared to 62 percent Indian (predominantly Hindu) and 64 percent
Caribbean (Modood et al., 1997: 329).
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